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Susan W. Brenner* & Leo L. Clarke**
I. INTRODUCTIONI
According to one estimate, 140 nations have, or are in the process of
developing, the capacity to wage cyberwarfare.2 Other countries will no
doubt follow suit. A 2009 global survey of IT and security executives work-
ing for critical infrastructure and computer security companies found that "45
percent believed their governments were either 'not very' or 'not at all' capa-
ble of preventing and deterring cyber attacks."3
While cyberwarfare will probably not displace traditional kinetic war-
fare,4 it will become an increasingly important weapon in the arsenals of
nation-states for several reasons. One of the primary reasons is cost: devel-
oping the capacity to wage cyberwar is inexpensive as compared to the cost
of developing and maintaining the capacity to wage twenty-first century ki-
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School of Law. E-mail: susanwbrenner@yahoo.com.
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2. See, e.g., Kevin Coleman, The Cyber Arms Race Has Begun, CSO ONLINE, Jan.
28, 2008, http:www.csoonline.com/article/216991/ColemanTheCyber
ArmsRacehasBegun?page- 1. See also Cyber Crime: A 24/7 Global Battle,
ITP REPORT, Nov.29, 2007, http://www.itpreport.com/default.asp?Mode=
Show&A=1421&R=GL (stating 120 nations have or are developing
cyberwarfare capabilities). Cyberwarfare is also known as information warfare,
electronic warfare, and cyberwar. See CLAY WILSON, INFORMATION OPERA-
TIONS, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, AND CYBERWAR: CAPABILITIES AND RELATED
POLICY ISSUEs, (2007), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31787.pdf.
3. McAFEE, IN THE CROSSFIRE: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AGE OF CYBER
WAR 26 (2009), http://newsroom.mcafee.com/images/10039/In%20the%20
CrossfireCIP%20report.pdf. Fifty percent of the executives "identified the
United States as one of the three countries 'most vulnerable to critical infra-
structure cyberattack'." Id. at 30.
4. "Kinetic" warfare "involve[s] the forces and energy of moving bodies, includ-
ing physical damage to or destruction of targets through use of bombs, missiles,
bullets, and similar projectiles." Air Force Glossary, Air Force Doctrine Docu-
ment 1-2 57, http://www.docstoc.com/docs/12530146/Air-Force-Glossary (Jan.
I1, 2007). For a more detailed description of kinetic warfare, see, e.g., Cheng
Hang Teo, The Acme of Skill: Non-Kinetic Warfare 2-3, AIR COMMAND AND
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netic war. 5 Since cyberwarfare will for the most part be waged over publicly
accessible networks,6 the expense involved primarily encompasses training
and paying cyberwarriors, as well as purchasing and maintaining the hard-
ware and software they will need to launch and counter cyber attacks.
In a recent article, we examined the need to involve civilians in
cyberwarfare and the legal devices government can use to compel such in-
volvement when necessary.7 In this article, we explore how law can and
should address the consequences of involving civilians in cyberwarfare.
First, we consider how civilians are likely to respond to their roles as willing
or unwilling combatants, and how they can mitigate the risks that status cre-
ates. Second, we consider how the law should allocate the risks of civilian
combat between the civilians and the polity in general.
The context of our analysis is the large corporations and institutions that
are likely to have the most at stake and to be the most affected by cyberwar.
Those civilian combatants will include (1) for-profit entities such as financial
institutions, telecommunications and transportation companies, utilities, ma-
jor internet sellers, and brick and mortar companies crucial to the distribution
of the goods and services that characterize American life and (2) non-profit
institutions from state and local government agencies, to hospitals, universi-
ties, and school districts. Indeed, if one accepts the very reasonable premise
that cyberwar is waged not primarily for territory or wealth, but for political
and cultural advantage, no segment of American culture can expect to escape
casualties in cyberwar. This is especially true given the frequency and sever-
ity of cyberwars that experts anticipate over the next few decades.
Our article is divided into three parts. Part I addresses preliminary ques-
tions: What is the difference between civilian and conscript status? Whether
the risk of cyberwar casualty is materially different from the risk of cyber-
crime and other IT hazards? And how will civilian executives react to threats
of cyberwar? We argue that, from the civilian's perspective, cyberwar
presents different hazards than the IT security risks presented by private
hackers and other cybercriminals. We also argue that, even if the threats to
the civilian's assets are the same, the risk of potential extensive governmen-
5. See, e.g., MARTIN C. LIBICKI, RAND CORPORATION, CYBERDETERRENCE AND
CYBERWAR xvi, 177 (2009), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/
RAND MG877.pdf; Stephen J. Cox, Comment, Confronting Threats Through
Unconventional Means: Offensive Information Warfare as a Covert Alterna-
tive to Preemptive War, 42 Hous. L. REV. 881, 891 (2005); John A. Serabian,
Jr., Info. Operations Issue Manager, CIA, Statement for the Record Before the
Joint Economic Committee on Cyber Threats and the U.S. Economy (Feb. 23,
2000), https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2000/
cyberthreats_022300.html.
6. See section II infra.
7. See Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Con-
scripts, VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (forthcoming 2010) hereinafter "Conscripts."
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tal regulation-or even conscription-requires a program of readiness and
response that differs materially from current IT security programs.
Part II analyzes the risks to civilians if their operations are disrupted by
either their status as combatants or victims. We identify the risks of legal
liability to shareholders, customers, suppliers, and other stakeholders as well
as the broader issues of political and reputational risk and consider how civil-
ians might manage those risks. We also consider the possibility of tort and
contract theories and conclude that tort remedies will probably be limited by
the economic loss doctrine, and that contract remedies will depend on rela-
tive bargaining power. As to suppliers, we conclude that most large enter-
prises will be able to shift the risk of their non-performance, or mal-
performance, caused by cyber attacks to their customers by means of con-
tractual limitations on liability. However, civilians whose operations involve
risks to property and life may have to seek special legislation or wait for the
development of viable insurance.
Part III examines the extent to which civilians can recoup economic
losses from cyberwar. In light of the prevalence of contractual disclaimers
and limitations in the economy, the general unavailability of adequate insur-
ance, and the low probability that Congress will establish a publicly funded
compensation fund, we conclude that the primary battleground will be the
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The primary issue we address is
whether the Constitution requires the federal government to compensate ci-
vilians for their costs and losses in the course of cyber combat, including the
costs of devoting their personnel, equipment, and other assets-especially
intellectual property-to the country's cyberwar effort. We conclude that the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is unlikely to provide a remedy to
civilians for the costs and losses imposed by government regulation or con-
scription, except in the case of a non-regulatory procurement well in advance
of an attack.
II. SHOULD CIVILIANS WORRY ABOUT BECOMING CASUALTIES?
A. The Casualties of Cyberwar: Civilians and Combatants
1. How a Civilian Entity Becomes a Casualty
A civilian can suffer direct casualties from a cyberwar in many ways
and for many reasons. How the casualty occurs will affect both the civilian's
approach to loss management, and its potential rights to compensation. We
will therefore offer some brief and simple examples of how casualties might
occur so the reader can put cyberwar risk into a context that allows compari-
son with more traditional risks.
First, a civilian can be a direct target of a cyberwar attack because an
attack on the civilian would directly accomplish a strategic or tactical goal of
the aggressor. For example, a foreign government might target the website
of a university because a faculty member is an outspoken opponent of the
government's treatment of a minority. An attack could also target a civilian
that is perceived as an exploiter of the country's resources.
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Second, the civilian could be a target because it is a means of attacking
others. For example, an electric utility could be targeted to affect a power
grid that supplies a telecommunications company used to attack the attacker.
Or a transportation system could be subjected to repeated, apparently random
attacks to create a loss of confidence in the government. Similarly, hospital
or school databases could be attacked to disrupt activities at the heart of
American personal security.
Third, a civilian can be an indirect victim. For example, an attack on
Federal Express that disrupts its services could cause lawyers to miss filing
deadlines. Attacks on banks could cause liquidity crises throughout the
economy. Successful attacks on county tax or deeds databases could disrupt
real property transfers.
Fourth, a civilian can become a victim not of a cyberwar attack, but of
its own government's response to the attack. Here are just three examples:
(1) The government might impose new and costly regulations to deter
or defend against attacks.8
(2) The government could allocate resources, such as telecommunica-
tions satellite capacity, in a manner that destroys a civilian's contract rights
or otherwise disrupts the civilian's normal business operations.
(3) The government might conscript specific assets or even the civil-
ian's entire enterprise.9
Fifth, a civilian can become a combatant because it perceives that par-
ticipation in the cyberwar can further its own interests. Alternatively, the
government conscripts the civilian and thrusts it into the combat zone. As
we demonstrated in Conscripts, the difference between combatants and civil-
ians, while traditionally distinct in kinetic warfare, is more nebulous in the
context of cyberwar.IO For example, if a telecommunications company ref-
uses to cooperate with any government-sponsored attack beyond providing
business services that it has already contractually committed to provide, in-
cluding those to governmental cyber-defense contractors, is it a combatant or
a civilian?
Note the difference here from traditional kinetic warfare. The telecom-
munications company is not comparable to the telephone company that car-
ries communications to the Pentagon, nor is it clearly analogous to the airline
company that delivers troops to the Western front. Rather, its services might
be a combination of the two; it will unwittingly deliver some packets of in-
formation outside the combat zone and some in the execution of an attack.
Because of these ambiguities, we believe that a civilian that is aware it is
participating in activities that are supportive of, even if not essential to,
8. The USA PATRIOT Act, 18 U.S.C. § I et seq. (2006) is a good example of
such a response.
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cyberwar, should consider itself a combatant, for that is clearly how it will be
perceived by opposing nations. In short, such a quasi-combatant essentially
assumes the risk that it will become a direct target of a cyber attack and
therefore should manage that risk just as any other direct target.
2. The Peculiar Status of Conscripts
Like Elvis Presley or Muhammad Ali, conscripted civilians face the risk
that the government will not employ their talents to the highest and best use,
and that conscription will impose both short-term and long-term adverse con-
sequences. During the period of conscription, injuries could occur that per-
manently reduce future income streams and adversely affect business plans.
In addition, the conscription of assets will undoubtedly result in lost opportu-
nities to expand existing business, develop new products, and enter new mar-
kets. Unlike the civilian, the conscript is not free to change its mind about
participation in the war or how it manages cyberwar risk. But that loss of
freedom does not distinguish the institutional conscript from the individual
conscript.
Our notion that institutions can be conscripted to assist in cyberwar de-
fense or attacks, however, also creates some unprecedented practical issues
regarding casualty risk. The fundamental issue is to define exactly what
rights the government acquires by conscription. In the case of an individual
who is drafted, we have a fairly intuitive idea of what he or she gives up and
what the military acquires. The conscript submits his body and, to a certain
extent, his personality and individual freedom to military control, but he does
not surrender his property and assets that are discrete from his person.
Organizations are different, however. Corporations and other legal enti-
ties-whether for profit, non-profit, or municipal-are often treated as the
equivalents of natural persons and even possess some of the same constitu-
tional rights as individuals."' In reality, however, a corporation is simply a
congeries of assets or, as corporate law scholars proclaim, a "nexus of con-
tracts."12 A corporation does not have a body that can serve as the manifesta-
tion of the thing conscripted. Thus, one of the fundamental decisions that
Congress will have to make, if it considers conscription as a possible means
of dealing with cyberwar, is how the military will define what is being con-
scripted. Is it a legal entity as a whole, specific assets (e.g., patents or equip-
ment), lines of business (e.g., cellular phone operations in specific states), or
functions (e.g., software design and development, IT security, or power grid
management)?
We believe that the most practicable approach to this issue is an analog
to individual conscription. The genius of the modem business organization
11. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010).
12. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Con-
tracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6 (2002) (discussing the view that the board of
directors is really a nexus of contracts, from which its powers flow).
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is its ability to combine the resources necessary to accomplish tasks that can-
not be accomplished by individuals. The need to conscript talent to fight
cyberwars requires that the individuals be able to accomplish tasks similar to
what they undertake in civilian life. This combination of human capacity and
capital (including specialized equipment, intellectual property, and "commu-
nity know-how") is the organizational equivalent to the natural person, with
his or her inherent physical and mental capabilities. Thus, a conscription
order should identify specific employees (e.g., by their names, titles, or func-
tions) and require turnover or access to the equipment and capital required to
perform their usual duties.
Just as drafting Elvis did not bring the Army his pink Cadillac or Grace-
land, conscription of the assets of Microsoft should not bring with it those
assets unrelated to its ability to perform the conscripted services-unrelated
intellectual property, cash, real estate, and line or staff operations. To con-
script more assets than needed would only impose unnecessary management
burdens on the military, and deprive stakeholders of more of their invest-
ments than are necessary to accomplish the purpose of conscription.
If this approach was adopted, it would be preferable for analytical pur-
poses to refer to the conscripted assets (employees and related capital) as
though they constituted a single person (civilian) separate from the larger
organization from which they came. Whether the military should also con-
script the relevant employees in their individual capacities raises issues that
are both beyond the scope of this article and unnecessary to decide. Al-
though we envision that it would be most efficient for the military to treat the
senior executive responsible for the functions conscripted as the senior of-
ficer or the "brain" of the conscripted "person," we also leave that discussion
for another day.
B. Does Cyberwar Risk Differ From Cybercrime Risk?
Before analyzing how civilians should respond to the casualty risk of
cyberwar, we must first consider whether cyberwar requires a different civil-
ian response than common cybercrime. After all, most civilians have a sub-
stantial IT security program in place to combat routine cybercrime intrusions
and those lacking such prophylactic measures likely do not care about
cyberwar.13 A civilian who has a sophisticated security program might be
indifferent to the threat of cyberwar. Civilian IT managers could reasonably
argue that whether or not it is necessary to distinguish between attacks result-
ing from a basement hacker, commercial espionage or theft, cyber extortion,
or full-fledged cyberwar. When protecting a civilian's systems, data, and
communication abilities, a security manager might believe that identifying
the motive behind or source of a cyber attack is a waste of time and re-
13. The authors have argued elsewhere previously that such security programs
should be mandated by law. S. Brenner and L. Clarke, Distributed Security:
Preventing Cybercrime, 23 J. MARSHALL J. OF COMP. & INFO. L. 659, 659
(2005).
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sources. This attitude has always influenced targets' willingness to report
criminal intrusions and explains victims' lack of enthusiasm for cooperating
with law enforcement-once the target has been identified and the threat has
been neutralized, the problem becomes someone else's.
Paradoxically, security managers could also argue that a cyberwar is
less threatening than other forms of cyber attacks because governments com-
bat cyberwars with more resources than are devoted towards fighting cyber-
crimes. Further, jurisdictional limits greatly hamper a civilian's protection
against cybercrime.14 Moreover, few law enforcement resources are devoted
towards fighting cybercrimes.15 The Federal government is able to devote
more and better resources to defend cyber attacks than it does to "mere"
cybercrime, for which law enforcement resources are spread notoriously thin
and greatly hampered by jurisdictional limits.16 Thus, in contrast, the federal
government takes cyberwar seriously.17 As a result, IT managers often shrug
off the threat of cyberwar as just consultant hype, believing that the govern-
ment's sound security principles will adequately address the risks.18
C. The Risks and Consequences of Cyberwar Require a Civilian
Response
Civilian governance is not likely to share the same indifference towards
cyberwar that IT managers may have. Corporate executives have broader
responsibilities than just protecting IT assets. They must also seek to in-
crease stakeholder value over both short-term and long-term horizons. How-
ever, cyberwar presents unusual short and long-term risks for the civilian
enterprise. Because of virtually unlimited resources available to govern-
ments, government sponsored cyber attacks on civilians' interests may be
frequent, prolonged, and severe. Also, American patriotism is likely to tie
cyberwar with the broader public interests, affecting corporate reputation and
brands, as well as business and employee relationships. Furthermore, the
costs and benefits of governmental regulation will be markedly different than
those of private cybercriminals who target only civilians for economic pur-
poses. Third, and most importantly, the risk of conscription, as will be de-
scribed below, creates interesting issues for corporate governance.
14. See id. at 669-70.
15. See id. at 667-68.
16. In contrast, the federal government, at least, is taking cyberwar seriously. See,
e.g., Shane Harris, The Cyberwar Plan, NAT'L J. MAG., Nov. 14, 2009
(describing U.S. military's efforts to "hire cyberwarriors"), available at http://
www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/cs_20091114_3145.php.
17. See id.
18. See, e.g., Evgeny Morozov, Battling the Cyber Warmongers, WALL ST. J., May
10, 2010, at W3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748
704370704575228653351323986.html.
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1. The Duties and Motivations of Executives
So what approach should executives take toward cyberwar risk? A
good starting point is the executives' fiduciary duty under the law of the
civilian's jurisdiction.19 The Model Business Corporations Act, for example,
proscribes that a director or officer of a corporation is relieved of liability if
she "act[s] in good faith" and "in a manner [she] reasonably believes to be in
the best interests of the corporation."20 Many courts often direct the triers-of-
fact to determine whether a breach of duty occurred given the common-law
"business judgment rule" ("BJR").21 Under the BJR, there exists "a pre-
sumption that in making a business decision, the director of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interest of the company."22 The presumption is
eliminated if illegality, fraud, or a conflict of interest existed.23
Under the BJR, executives face little risk of personal liability for their
inadequate responses to cyberwarfare. Many states also permit corporations
to limit shareholders' rights for breach of duty to injunctive relief.24 Further-
more, most sizable corporations provide executives with insurance that pro-
tects them against shareholder claims for breach of the duty of care.25
19. For non-governmental entities, this is usually the jurisdiction in which the en-
tity is incorporated or otherwise chartered. See, e.g., Folkes v. Cent. of Ga. Ry.
Co., 80 So. 458 (Ala. 1918) (precluding a suit in an Alabama court because it
was incorporated in another state). The following discussion focuses on non-
governmental civilians. For "governmental" civilians, such as schools and
state and local governments, one could substitute a discussion of political or
public responsibility. In neither case is the executive likely to be motivated by
threats of personal liability for damages, but rather by career and reputational
interest.
20. Model Bus. Corp. Act, § 8.30, 8.42. (2002).
21. See, e.g., Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 704-06 (Del. 2009); see also Lees
Inn of Am. v. William R. Lee Irrevocable Trust, 924 N.E.2d 143, 157 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2010).
22. Lees Inn, 924 N.E.2d at 157.
23. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (concluding
a suit against corporate directors was not sustainable because nothing improper
was alleged).
24. See, e.g., Harnett v. Billman, 800 F.2d 1308, 1316 (4th Cir. 1986) (concluding
a minority shareholder was limited to injunctive relief in a breach of fiduciary
duty suit).
25. For a thorough discussion of this insurance, see Bennett L. Ross, Protecting
Corporate Directors and Officers: Insurance and Other Alternatives, 40 VAND.
L. REV. 775, 775 (1987) (evaluating the effectiveness of Directors & Officers
policies and its substitutes; see also Model Bus. Corp. Act. § 8.57 (2002).
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For publicly held companies, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX")
supplements the minimal duties required by the BJR.26 SOX requires the
chief executive officer of a covered civilian to certify the adequacy of the
company's internal controls affecting external financial reporting. 27 Because
information technology plays such a crucial role in the recording and report-
ing of financial information, the adequacy of a company's information secur-
ity program is considered in SOX compliance determinations.28 While
analysis of the impact of SOX is beyond the scope of this article, it is evident
that SOX has motivated executives to carefully address the threat of
cyberwars.
Although a concern for personal liability is unlikely to motivate an ex-
ecutive, executives may still be motivated by the broader concept of "corpo-
rate responsibility" in proactively responding to cyberwars. For example, an
executive may consider the deleterious effects on her company's own IT sys-
tems and assets as well as the potential risks to strategic partners, suppliers,
and customers. Because executives have no legal duty to maximize profit,
non-financial exposure to cyberwar should be contemplated as well. At a
fundamental level, executives can and should consider not just the value of
the civilian's own IT systems and assets, but also the risks to strategic part-
ners, suppliers, and customers because detrimental effects on such parties
could ultimately adversely affect the civilian's own financial welfare. More-
over, executives can take in to account even non-financial exposures. Con-
trary to some ideological views of the responsibility of corporate
management, executives have no legal duty to maximize long or short term
profits.29 Instead, major corporations routinely profess commitment to goals
that extend beyond achieving competitive financial returns and long-term
stability.30
These realities mean that executives are likely to respond to the threat of
cyberwars more proactively than would be justified by mere concern for IT
values. Protecting a company's current asset values might require that an
executive do more than raise barriers to competitive entry using the most
cost-effective means. She might also need to protect the company's reputa-
26. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, PL 107-204, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006). The Act
and the regulations implementing the Act are complex. For an explanation and
critique of the Act, see, Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2004).
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 7262.
28. See id.
29. See Leo L. Clarke, Bruce P. Frohnen & Edward C. Lyons, The Practical Soul
of Business Ethics: The Corporate Manager's Dilemma and the Social Teach-
ing of the Catholic Church, 29 SEATErLE U. L. REV. 139, 149-63 (2005) (argu-
ing that corporations have neither a legal nor an ethical duty to maximize
profits).
30. Id. at 151-53.
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tion for good corporate citizenship by cooperating with governmental author-
ities and by protecting the interests of strategic partners, suppliers, and
customers.
For example, larger companies-especially companies in regulated in-
dustries and publically-held companies-often incur costs that cannot be jus-
tified based on strict profit-maximization. Executives of these companies
recognize the long-term value of government cooperation as well as the ben-
efits of good public relations.31 Thus, executives can act consistently with
their fiduciary duties even if they comply with governmental pressure. An-
other possibility is that executives can be overly concerned with the potential
liability of their suppliers, customers, and other third parties to the threat of
cyberwar. In short, civilian executives have extremely broad discretion in
responding to cyberwars in a fashion that reflects their evaluation of all risks.
As a result of these factors, executives will likely consider an intrusion
into a civilian's IT system to be of paramount importance in determining the
many resources that should be devoted towards countering these attacks.
The executives will probably promulgate written policies and procedures that
address at least the following key issues: detection and reporting of attempted
intrusions, whether intrusions are related to other intrusions into the civilian's
system or part of a larger cyber attack, and how to execute an appropriate
response.
2. Possible Executive Approaches to the Risk of Conscription
Economic reasons often prompt civilians to disregard the threat of
cybercrime. When evaluated in terms of severity and frequency, the costs of
prevention and prosecution are greater than actual losses. However, if we are
correct in our conclusion that cyberwar will result in conscription of civilians
to defend-and perhaps to launch-attacks,32 then executives must change
their economic calculus. After all, a conscript will no means to avert the
combat and will not be able to avoid the related costs. And once a conscrip-
tion law is passed, civilian managers would have a fiduciary duty to prepare
the civilian to respond to and comply with the conscription law.33 The risk
that a civilian's work force, equipment, and intangible assets could be
usurped by the government would, especially for a large enterprise, require
extensive contingency planning, regardless of government compensation. In
31. This inclination is demonstrated by the prevalence of corporate philanthropy,
despite the views of such notable critics as Warren Buffett. Buffett believes
that shareholders, not corporate managers, should determine the amount and
destination of corporate profits to be used for charitable purposes. See Law-
rence A. Cunningham, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons For Corporate
America, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 5, 47-54 (1997).
32. See Brenner & Clarke, supra note 7, (manuscript at 63-67).
33. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 966-70 (Del. Ch.
1996).
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a sense, the risk of conscription would supplant IT risk as the motivating
force to treat cyberwar differently from cybercrime.
III. DEALING WITH THE THREAT OF CYBERWAR:
RISK-BASED RESPONSES
A. Risk-Management Principles
Our discussion in Part I indicates that civilians will engage in a broad
calculus in determining the optimal response to cyberwar. A common meth-
odology for managing cyber-risk is to identify the risks the institution faces,
assess the magnitude of those risks, and then attempt to prevent, mitigate, or
shift them so that their impact on the institution is deemed acceptable in light
of the institution's goals and risk tolerance.34
The first step, risk identification, requires that the civilian identify each
way in which a cyber attack could adversely affect the civilian. Such nega-
tive effects include adverse impacts on its operations, its financial condition
and prospects, its potential legal liabilities, its dealings with government, and
the effects on the public at large.35 "Operational risk" is sometimes used to
refer to the impact of cyberwar on the civilian's operations and its ability to
generate revenues and profits. Because of the breadth of the definition of
"operational risk" and the virtually unlimited different types of businesses
affected by cyberwar, discussion of this risk is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. We will, however, generally address "legal," "political," and "reputa-
tional" risks.
"Legal risk" refers to the possibility that the civilian will be held liable
to third parties because of a failure to defend against a cyber attack or partici-
pate in a counterattack. "Political risk" refers to the risk that the civilian's
response or lack of response to the threat of cyberwar will result in govern-
ment regulation, whether by legislation or administrative action. "Reputa-
tional risk" refers to the potential impact on a civilian's brands and
goodwill.36 This risk is even harder to quantify than political risk. It has an
even more attenuated relationship to reality and generally has a shorter half-
life unless the perceived damage caused by the civilian is sufficient to de-
stroy a brand.
The second step, risk quantification, involves analysis of the probabili-
ties that a risk event will occur and an estimate of the damage that the civil-
ian will suffer if the risk event occurs.37 The determinative factors used in
this calculation are often referred to as frequency and severity.38 For exam-
34. See James S. Mullarney, Arming Yourself Quantification Strategies, in Scott
K. Lange et al., e-risk: LIABILITIES IN A WIRED WORLD (2000).
35. See id. at 179.
36. Id. at 183.
37. Id. at 185.
38. Id.
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pie, a denial-of-service attack that affected an internet seller for three hours
would cause a certain loss of revenue and perhaps a certain reputational harm
that may affect future business. An estimated loss is determined by multiply-
ing the range of dollar loss expected from the attack and is multiplied by the
probability that such an attack will occur.39
The civilian would conduct similar evaluations for all potential attacks.
Similarly, a hospital would analyze the potential of an attack that could result
in loss or corruption of medical records, which in turn could lead to signifi-
cant personal injuries and resulting lawsuits and liabilities. Water-treatment
facilities would measure the frequency and severity of attacks that might al-
low the introduction of contaminants into the community water supply. The
probability of each scenario and the resulting harm are obviously matters of
great speculation given our lack of loss-history, but the risk quantification is
essential to effective risk management.40
The third step in this risk-management approach is to identify and im-
plement risk reduction, mitigation, and shifting mechanisms that will allow
the civilian to reduce the risk of loss to an acceptable level. 41 Risk reduction
in this context entails primarily IT security measures aimed at preventing
intrusions into a civilian's IT system since the civilian has no control over the
sources of potential cyber attacks and very little control over the means of
delivery of such attacks (typically the telecommunications systems that un-
derlie the Internet). Risk mitigation focuses on reducing the harm that would
flow from an intrusion or from other adverse impacts on a civilian from a
disruption in its operations or revenues from a successful cyber attack on its
vendors or customers.
Risk shifting involves agreements or legislation that either (1) relieves
the civilian from liability for harm that would otherwise be imposed, or (2)
requires another party to compensate the civilian for its loss. Examples of
the first type of risk shifting are common contractual provisions such as force
majeure clauses, limitation on liability clauses, liquidated damages clauses,
and legislative immunities and exemptions. Examples of the latter are in-
demnity agreements and insurance contracts.
Any of these diverse risks could cause catastrophic damages to any
number of civilians. In some cases the casualties might be random while in
others cases, the casualties may be industry-wide or even economy-wide.
How should civilian management address these risks? In the remainder of
this Part, we will provide some examples of how civilians might employ
these principles to manage the risks of cyberwar casualties.
39. See id at 189.
40. Mullamey, supra note 34, at 186.
41. Id. at 189-90.
260 [Vol. XBI
Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Casualties
B. Legal Risk of Third-Party Claims for Cyberwar Damage
1. Contract liability
At present, a civilian does not have a statutory obligation to participate
in a cyber defense or attack. Yet the civilian's response to the cyberwar
might affect its relationships, contractual or otherwise, with third parties. For
example, a bank has a duty to its customers to honor properly presented pay-
ment orders.42 Similarly, utilities have regulatory and contractual duties to
provide services to customers on terms set out in tariffs or contracts. 43
One aspect of legal risk is that an attack-or a civilian's defense against
that attack, or its participation in a counter-attack-may cause the civilian to
breach its promise to provide goods or services (e.g., electricity, internet ac-
cess, water) to its customers.44 Many civilians attempt to avoid such risk by
including in their contracts or tariffs an "act-of-God" or "force-majeure"
clause. These clauses disclaim any liability for failure to perform the con-
tract because of events or forces beyond the control of the civilian, including
war, government regulations, a labor strike, and a failure of utilities.45 Given
the new and seldom understood nature of cyberwars, however, it is entirely
possible that a civilian's exculpatory force-majeure provision will not include
cyberwar, which constitutes neither war nor insurrection as such terms are
traditionally understood. In the absence of such a specific contractual provi-
sion, it is likely that a court would apply some variant of the "impossibility"
doctrine, which considers whether the cause of the breach was foreseeable
and unavoidable.46 Although it might be possible for a civilian with a solid
IT security program to build a case under the impossibility doctrine, courts
are not sympathetic.47
42. U.C.C. § 4A-209 (2007).
43. See, e.g., Con Edison: Rates and Tariffs, http://www.coned.com/rates/ (last vis-
ited May 22, 2010).
44. Attacks that are intended to disrupt online services are typically referred to as
"denial-of-service attacks." Cyber attacks can also, of course, disrupt services
in the physical world-from the inability of a bank branch to verify funds on
deposit so that it can honor a validly drawn and presented check to the inability
of a natural gas company to access pipelines so that it can deliver gas to its
customers.
45. For examples of such a clause, see Clauses and Explanations: Force Majeure,
http://www.library.yale.edu/-llicense/forcecls.shtml (last visited May 29,
2010). For a discussion of the enforceability of force majeure clauses, see Ed-
ward H. Bergin, Force Majeure And Impossibility Of Performance (2009),
Jones Walker E*Bulletin September 17, 8 http://www.texasbarjoneswalker.
com/flashdrive/materials/business law section cle/Business&CorporateBer-
ginArticle.pdfnews-publications-551.html (last visited August 14, 2010).
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 261 (1981).
47. See, e.g., Am. Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l. Marine, 453 F.2d 939, 942
(2d Cir. 1972) (finding an ocean carrier not discharged of its obligation to de-
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The civilian's failure to provide services as a result of damage caused
by cyberwar or by the diversion of resources to support a counterattack also
creates the specter of liability for consequential damages. For example, the
failure to provide adequate IT security to thwart an attack can create disrup-
tions in services with far-reaching consequences along the lines of the "for
want of a nail" nursery rhyme that could destroy the civilian.48 Similarly,
private data could be misappropriated and then released, violating contractual
undertakings.
These risks sound worse than they are because virtually all civilians
disclaim or limit liability for consequential damages, and such disclaimers
and limits are generally enforceable regardless of their reasonableness.49
Therefore, a civilian's failure to defend against an attack or its inept partici-
pation in a defense or counterattack is unlikely to result in substantial liabil-
ity for consequential damage to customers if its contractual limitations apply
and are enforceable under applicable law.
How should the existence of these contractual legal risks affect manage-
ment's attitude toward cyberwars? There are five responses that should be
adopted as a matter of course and which should already be in place in some
fashion to deal with general security threats. First, management should care-
fully evaluate IT security's requests for resources since a civilian that is em-
ploying anything short of state-of-the-art defenses can hardly claim that it
was "impossible" to perform its contracts.
Second, the legal department should be instructed to draft customer and
supplier contracts to ensure that the contracts accurately include cyberwar as
a force majeure. Third, the civilian should conduct an analysis of its ability
to prove the factual predicates of the force majeure defense. Fourth, the ci-
vilian should document the nature of threats as they occur to show that any
resulting claims can be traced to the unforeseen cause.
Fifth, the civilian's insurance coverage should be reviewed to determine
whether risk of liability can be shifted to an insurer. Although breach of
contract is typically not insurable and losses from "war" are not insurable,
coverage may be available for losses caused by third-party torts even if the
liability arises from a contract. Moreover, the civilian may wish to investi-
gate the availability of business-interruption insurance, which would cover
the loss of revenue caused by an inability to perform.
liver goods because of the closing of the Suez Canal on account of the Six Day
War of 1967 because alternative routes, although more expensive, were availa-
ble for the carrier when traversing through the Suez Canal was not part of the
agreement); see also Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. U.S., 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (another Suez closing case in which the court found no force
majeure when impossibility was urged based only on expense).
48. See, e.g., Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) (The classic law-
school case is in which a carrier's failure to timely deliver a broken mill shaft
led to a substantial loss of profits.).
49. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-719 (2004).
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Cyber attacks can also present contractual legal risks of an entirely new
nature. Because cyber attacks are not always economically motivated and
can be aimed at wreaking general havoc, it is certainly possible that cyber
attackers will not just disrupt existing contractual relationships but also cre-
ate contractual obligations where none exist. For example, a cyber-attacker
could change the terms of service and legal disclaimers on websites and
click-wrap agreements by eliminating disclaimers or adding promises,
thereby creating liabilities where none existed.50
Another possible scenario is an attack on a broker or dealer that trans-
fers investment securities to or from the broker's customers, without the cus-
tomer's authorization, to the attacker's accounts at foreign banks. Or an
airline's schedules and ticketing could be manipulated so that seats are sold
on non-existent flights or flight times are randomly changed. One can easily
imagine the resulting chaos.
Each of these contingencies would create what would look to the injured
party and to the courts as a breach of contract. Banks, airlines, utilities, and
other sellers of goods and services have virtually vitiated the contractual
rights of their customers so that sellers have very little risk for non-perform-
ance.51 But the elimination of key disclaimers or the addition of specific
warranties could create huge liabilities for civilians in targeted industries.
Although the civilian might argue that the contract is voidable under the doc-
trine of "unilateral mistake," that doctrine usually requires that the other
party (here, the customer) was at least aware of the fact that the contract did
not actually represent the intention of the civilian.52 That element would pre-
sumably be difficult to prove unless the resulting deal was too good to be
true.53
50. For example, one can imagine a situation where cyber attackers changed the
"terms of use" of a website or terms of a "click-wrap" agreement to eliminate
disclaimers of liability for consequential damages. After all, how often does
anyone read those terms? Absent a controlling statute, the elimination of the
disclaimer would put the civilian in the situation of having to defend claims for
consequential damages on the grounds that the damages were not reasonably
foreseeable from the breach of contract. The ability of a bank or a utility, for
example, to make that argument successfully is far from a certainty.
51. See Leo L. Clarke, Performance Risk, Form Contracts and UCITA, 7 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2001), available at http://www.mttlr.
org/volseven/clarke.html.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981).
53. Of course, the attacker could create situations where the civilian did not breach
contracts, but instead bestowed windfalls on customers, for example, by chang-
ing software to under-price goods or services. The civilian's ability to recoup
such windfalls through the usual vehicle of restitution (also called unjust en-
richment) might be foiled by the customer's lack of knowledge and by the
civilian's own failure to prevent the attack.
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How should management respond to such a legal risk? Again, better IT
security is one answer, but security alone is rarely sufficient. Similarly, by
definition, contract language cannot protect against such attacks. Instead,
perhaps the best response might be extremely diligent surveillance of attacks
and detection of their impacts in order to limit the amount of damage. The
possibility of risk shifting through insurance should also be considered.
2. Managing the Risk of Tort Liability
For present purposes, we can define a tort as an act or omission that
does not arise from a contract that gives rise to civil liability. Usually, the
imposition of tort liability depends on a wrongful act or omission in violation
of a duty imposed by law, although civilians engaged in "ultra-hazardous
activity" might be held strictly liable for injuries arising from that activity.54
Cyber attacks can result in tort liability for the civilian because the attack
directly damages the civilian's property or operations in such a way that third
parties are damaged by the civilian. Or an attack could be directed at a target
other than the civilian, but the attack would affect the civilian's relationships
with third parties in a way that causes harm to the third parties.
An example of the former would be an attack on a utility that causes a
power substation to explode or a water treatment plant to release contami-
nated water into the city water supply. Examples of the latter would be at-
tacks on a traffic control system that increases the risk of collisions between
a civilian's planes or trucks and third parties or an attack on a utility that
causes a hospital to lose connectivity with its records database or key medi-
cal equipment. Scenarios of tort liability are almost limitless given the per-
vasiveness of internet use in American commerce.
In light of the universe of potential risks, the typical response of a civil-
ian to potential cyberwars would be to use reasonable efforts to avoid or
mitigate third-party harm and to buy liability insurance. Whether or not in-
surance will be available depends, as indicated above, on whether the insurer
has excluded damage caused by cyberwars.
Cyber attacks also present a non-traditional-tort legal risk, just as was
the case with contractual legal risk. Most tortious conduct occurs in the ordi-
nary course of human events-whether business or leisure. Thus, the puta-
tive tortfeasor, here the civilian, must balance the utility of the act or
omission versus the potential for harm and resulting liability.
This balancing is unlikely to occur in the present context, however, be-
cause the initiating cause-the cyber-attacker-cares not a whit about social
54. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 521 (1938). The most recent version of
the restatement cites these activities as "abnormally dangerous." RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20 (2005). Violation of a duty imposed by contract
does not usually give rise to tort liability. See, e.g., Bellevue S. Assoc. v. HRH
Constr. Corp., 579 N.E. 2d 195, 196 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that the owner of a
housing project could not recover on a products liability theory against a
contractor).
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utility or risk of harm and the civilian is a victim with no real control over
resulting harm. Instead, the civilian is likely to be held liable for the result-
ing harm only because its failure to prevent the effects of the attack violated
its duty to use due care and the resulting harm was foreseeable enough to
constitute a "proximate cause" of the resulting harm.
In this regard, civilians should be aware of the potential that putative
plaintiffs-those harmed by the civilian's product or property as affected by
the attack-will likely resort to theories of "secondary liability" to collect
damages from the civilian.55 The Restatement of Torts recognizes three vari-
eties of such liability:
§ 876. Persons Acting In Concert
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of
another, one is subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to
a common design with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the
other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing
a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, con-
stitutes a breach of duty to the third person.56
Note that this section assumes that the harm underlying the claim for
damages results from the tortious conduct of the cyber attacker and not that
of the civilian. This means that the civilian can be held liable for severe
wrongs (such as wrongful death) even though its own wrongful conduct is
mere negligence in failing to prevent access to its systems.57
The most likely theories will be "aiding and abetting" and "acting in
concert." The former requires proof that the civilian had "actual knowledge"
of the attack and "substantially assisted" it.58 The elements of acting in con-
cert are even more amorphous: simple assistance with a separate breach of
duty, which might include something as trivial as allowing access to the ci-
vilian's systems (substantial assistance), combined with a failure to maintain
the privacy of information (breach of duty).
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979) (imposes participant lia-
bility using theories of conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and "acting in
concert").
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (wife held
liable for wrongful death of doctor murdered by her burglar husband, where
she was generally aware that her husband's income resulted from burglaries
and assisted her husband in conducting them).
58. See Richard C. Mason, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting, 61 Bus. LAW.
1135, 1146-47 (2006).
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Many courts disfavor such attenuated theories of liability59 and narrow
the reach of the doctrines by focusing on whether the alleged participant was
acting in the ordinary course of its business and just grinding out "grist for
the mill." 60
Thus, to the extent a civilian did not know of the plans of the attacker or
act out of its ordinary course of business in failing to detect the intrusion or
attempting to mitigate its effects, a court might hold that Section 876 liability
was not warranted.61 On the other hand the Seventh Circuit, in an en banc
decision delivered by Judge Posner, recently adopted a broad brush approach
to participant liability in a case seeking to impose participant liability on
defendants alleged to have funded terrorist organizations that were allegedly
responsible for the murder of an American-Israeli citizen.62 Because the
plaintiff in that case alleged that the defendants knew that the parties they
funded were involved in financing terrorism, the cyberwar context is not di-
rectly analogous to Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief & Develop-
ment. But the case still raises the possibility that a civilian that ignores the
risk of cyberwars will not escape at least the expense of litigating claims that
arise because of its failure to take prophylactic action.
C. Political Risk of Cyberwar
1. Political Risk in General
Civilians will also evaluate the political risk inherent in any response to
cyberwar. Political risk takes a variety of forms, but for the purposes of this
article, the focus will be on the risk that the government will take adverse
actions as a result of a civilian's failure to follow actions "suggested" by a
regulator. Political risk can be far more costly than legal liability risk be-
cause its effects are pervasive, prospective, and potentially perpetual. Stated
differently, liability to even a large number of customers tends to be a one-
time hit to the bottom line, whereas a political response tends to impose
entity-wide compliance costs that carry over, even after the risk of attack has
been reasonably addressed.
Therefore, although political risk is less quantifiable than legal risk, it
may be more significant because the primary targets of cyberwars-includ-
ing financial institutions, utilities, telecommunications companies, common
carriers, and health care providers-are all heavily regulated. Regulation
creates a substantially greater political risk for targets, because regulators
59. See Casey v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 401, 412 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005); see also In re Sharp Int'l Corp., 403 F.3d 43, 52-53 (2d Cir. 2005).
60. See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 96 (5th Cir. 1975).
61. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d. 1451, 1465-66 (2d. Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing the requisite standard of knowledge was not met in an action against key-
board manufacturers for stress injuries).
62. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 692-694, 704 (7th
Cir. 2008).
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have such broad discretion that they can retaliate for a civilian's failure to
cooperate with the defense of a cyber attack. Prevalent examples of regula-
tory-risk events include denials of applications for regulatory approvals or
licenses, delays in application processing, approvals subject to burdensome
or unanticipated conditions, and unanticipated enforcement actions or sanc-
tions for violations.
For this reason alone, it can be expected that regulated civilians will
generally cooperate with governmental regulators, unless the risks of cooper-
ation approach those of non-cooperation. One factor that will weigh against
cooperation is the extent to which the civilian operates in jurisdictions with
conflicting interests. For example, China is considered a probable cyber-
belligerent force against the United States. A U.S.-based multinational entity
with substantial connections with China, including valuable franchises in
China, and perhaps even a large percentage of its stock held by the Chinese
government, may be unwilling to cooperate fully with the United States in
defending cyber attacks. Instead, its response to U.S. government encour-
agement may be, "We would love to cooperate, but we must respect our
stakeholders' interests first."
Moreover, cooperation with one government may violate regulations or
comparable policies of other governments. For example, a U.S. regulatory
agency may request that a civilian provide government investigators with
information about suppliers or customers that may have obtained unautho-
rized access to the civilian's IT system, and such a request could violate
European Union privacy regulations. Similarly, a decision by a telecommu-
nications network to terminate service for an alleged attacker, or to carry
counter-attack packets for the United States, may violate the terms of its
franchise in other countries where transmitting or receiving equipment is
located.
In light of these considerations, civilian cooperation with governments
will be circumscribed by the fact that political risk cannot be evaluated on a
nation-by-nation basis. Political risk analysis must take into account the ma-
teriality of the civilian's international interests, the relationships between the
governments themselves, and the degree of confidence that the source and
nature of the attack can be properly identified.
2. Examples of Political Loss in the Context of Cyberwar
To this crude analysis of political risk must be added the nature of possi-
ble government sanctions. Certainly, the mere risk of censure or a modest
fine will pale in comparison to a more serious sanction. To date, the fre-
quency and severity of cyberwars are largely matters of guesswork. How-
ever, as weapons improve, we can expect to see more blatant and aggressive
attacks that use or injure the private sector.
It will be natural for governments to respond to such attacks by attempt-
ing to regulate, and perhaps control, civilians that are used as tools or means
of delivery of attack weapons. Such government regulation can take the
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form of incentives, or alternately, threats. Below are just a few examples of
the costs and losses the U.S. government could impose on civilians.
The government might regulate the terms of civilians' contracts with
suppliers and customers to shift risks or impose costs related to cyber de-
fense. Even changes that would reduce a civilian's legal risk may not be in
the civilian's favor in a globalized economy where adversely affected parties
can migrate to competitors from other jurisdictions that do not limit their
rights or recourse for disruption to their businesses.63
Following the model of the USA PATRIOT Act,64 the government
could mandate adoption of internal policies and procedures, impose detailed
reporting requirements, proscribe dealings with certain individuals, organiza-
tions, or countries, and impose criminal sanctions for assisting or not suffi-
ciently defending attacks.
The government could exercise its taking power under the Fifth Amend-
ment by taking control and/or ownership (either temporary or permanent) of
the civilian's property, ranging from telecommunications networks to patents
owned by a university. Whether such action would constitute a constitu-
tional "taking" that would require payment of "just compensation" is dis-
cussed below, but even if it were so held, the "just compensation" might not
represent a market-return on the lost asset.65
The government could simply draft or conscript personnel and property
owned by the civilian without payment of compensation. The political risk
of conscription requires some explanation.
3. Conscription as a Political Risk
A distinguishing characteristic of information technology is its encapsu-
lation in patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and other forms of intellectual
property which entitle the owner of that property to control its use by third
persons. The most common forms of such control are licensing agreements
and lawsuits for infringement. One effect of this characteristic is that IT
capabilities are generally localized to the owner or licensee of a particular
property, such that an individual employee cannot accomplish the same out-
put if she is disassociated from her employer.
As a result, it is not as though the military can create a cyber defense by
drafting individual IT all-stars. Instead, it must do so either via agreement
63. As suggested above, this factor is not likely to be significant in the consumer
context because consumers have no bargaining power in certain situations such
as non-price and non-quality terms. However, it might affect commercial
transactions, especially those involving technology and other high dependence/
high risk products.
64. See 18 U.S.C. § I et seq. (2006).
65. See U.S. CONsTr. amend. V; see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469 (2005) (holding that the taking of property for city development was for
public use and did not require just compensation).
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(consensual requisition) or conscription, through the acquisition of both tech-
nology and individuals or of organizations familiar enough with that technol-
ogy to make it a protective device or successful weapon. 66
Technology is, of course, the means by which an outcome is accom-
plished and not the outcome itself. Therefore, the military may have the
option of acquiring many different technologies with which it believes it can
equally successfully conduct a cyberwar. The availability of such options
creates a political risk for each civilian that may have the technology the
military would like to use. Even if the civilian is ultimately persuaded to
agree to provide its technology and personnel to the cyberwar effort, rather
than risk conscription, the mere risk of conscription is a political risk that can
be mitigated through the political process. 67
Because conscription increases the risk of combatant status and thus
increases the magnitude of casualty risk to the civilian, it is logical to expect
that civilians will spend substantial resources on attempting to avoid con-
scription-especially since, as we conclude below, conscription does not
equate to compensation. Therefore, we can expect that civilians will attempt
to entice the military to contract for, rather than conscript, their services. On
the other hand, the military will have every incentive to use the threat of
conscription as a bargaining tool to achieve a low procurement cost or other
favorable procurement terms. The civilian's most likely response is to use its
political access and clout to change the military's attitude.
D. Reputational Risk
1. Reputational Risk in the Context of Cyberwar
Reputational risk includes any potential impact on a civilian's good-
will-from perceptions that cellular service is not reliable to rumors that uni-
versity faculty members are fellow travelers with foreign despots. Opinions
on the reliability, safety, and other attributes of the affected civilian's goods
and services will eventually affect the civilian's operations and revenues. To
a certain extent, reputational risk is subsumed in the risk categories described
above because harm to reputation often leads to reduced revenues and in-
creased litigation and governmental scrutiny.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to consider reputational risk separately
because doing so tends to bring into clearer focus the intangible aspect of
cyberwar. For example, reputational risk dominates the risk profile of a
cyber attack launched solely for propaganda purposes because propaganda
focuses on the respective reputations of attacker and target. It follows that
66. As an example, one can imagine that a team of Mac programmers would not
have the same output of PC programs as a team of PC-experienced
programmers.
67. This process is familiar to those who lived through past drafts. Relationships
with Congressmen, bureaucrats, friendly doctors, and immigration officials
may reduce the political risk of conscription.
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those attacking a civilian as part of a broader strategic propaganda campaign
will focus on reputational aspects distinct from those involving the civilian's
products. Such attacks may be similar to the attacks on Proctor & Gamble,
in which it was accused of promoting Satanism. 68 For example, cyber attack-
ers could create phishing sites or deface a civilian's own web page to associ-
ate it with unpopular causes.
Given the harm to personal reputations arising from associations with
unpopular institutions, we can expect that civilian executives will be moti-
vated to protect their personal reputations and those of their colleagues and
investors even at the price of monetary loss to their employers. Since execu-
tives and other key stakeholders of civilians that fail to aggressively defend
against such attacks or cooperate with the government's cyberwar effort are
likely to suffer a loss of reputation, we can expect that they will use their best
efforts and discretion to defend against an attacker's propaganda.
2. Reputational Risk in the International Context
Many civilians do business in many countries or have relationships with
constituencies that might have adverse loyalties or interests in a cyberwar.
This is likely in the case of an ambiguous cyber attack with its uncertain
protagonist and objective.69 For example, an oil company might have supply
or output contracts with warring countries or a university might have foreign
campuses or programs with adversaries. This may lead such multi-national
enterprises to attempt to create a perception of neutrality or a perception of
unbiased support for all potential combatants. For example, the oil company
might declare that it will continue to honor all contracts but will otherwise
not expand its operation. Alternately, the university may attempt to central-
ize all activities that might impact the cyberwar, including its faculty's con-
sulting contracts with the warring nations.
One potential difficulty of such an approach is that combatants might
not accept the civilian's stance and may wage a propaganda war that attempts
to show the civilian is actually a combatant or at least a sympathizer. Or they
may not attack the civilian's spin, but might directly attack the civilian in
order to accomplish a change in behavior. In a sense, then, the multi-national
civilian might find that its very attempts at avoiding reputational harm has
thrust it into the war as a combatant and therefore increased its operational
and other risks.
A conscripted civilian will face different reputational risks because at
least part of its business will be under direct government control. Opposing
belligerents are unlikely to care about the different motivations and legal
niceties that flow from conscription, which will present civilian management
with complicated issues of corporate governance. For example, assume the
U.S. government conscripted the entire assets of a corporation incorporated
68. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 542 (5th Cir. 2001).
69. See Brenner & Clarke, supra note 7.
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in Delaware and that among those assets were the shares in numerous foreign
subsidiary entities. The rights of a parent to control its subsidiary's activities
are limited by the law of the jurisdiction in which the subsidiary is organized.
Foreign corporate law typically does not entitle the parent to exercise day-to-
day operational management, regardless of the customary practice that re-
flects economic reality. Therefore, the parent and non-shareholder stake-
holders in the foreign subsidiary may perceive different reputational risks or
determine that different risk management techniques are appropriate.70 They
should be free to manage those risks in accordance with the interests of the
foreign subsidiary, even if those interests differ from those of the U.S. gov-
ernment. We base this conclusion on the fact that U.S. law recognizes the
separate identity of the foreign subsidiary and the parent has pre-existing
fiduciary duties to the subsidiary.71
IV. SHIFTING CYBERWAR LOSSES: WHO Is GOING TO PAY FOR TIs?
A. Potential Targets
In light of the increased evidence of severe cyber attacks, even a civilian
employing careful risk prevention and mitigation practices (especially one in
the financial services, energy, and other infrastructure industries) can expect
to suffer substantial casualties from cyberwar. In this part, we analyze
whether a civilian casualty will be likely to recoup its losses from third par-
ties. There are four potential sources:
1. BELLIGERENTS. Efforts have been made under U.S. law to hold for-
eign governments liable for losses suffered by civilians in the course of an
attack.72 The likelihood of significant success against cyber attackers is re-
mote, however, because of the legal issues relating to sovereign immunity
and comity, and the practical difficulties of identifying the source of the at-
tack and demonstrating a causal connection between the attack and the harm.
2. CONTRIBUTORS. Parties that caused the casualty tortiously or by
breach of contract might also be liable for cyberwar losses. For example, a
pharmaceutical manufacturer that suffers a plant shutdown might seek dam-
ages from its electrical utility for not taking reasonable efforts to protect the
power grid. In our judgment, the ability to shift losses to third parties will be
greatly limited by legislation, common law tort principles, and, most impor-
tantly, the contractual disclaimers, waivers, and limitations, discussed above.
Loss-shifting to other private parties is therefore unlikely, given the almost
universal use of contractual limitations and the reluctance of courts to inter-
fere with so-called "freedom of contract."
70. This consideration also applies to legal and political risk.
71. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720, 722 (Del. 1971).
72. See, e.g., Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428
(1989) (holding there was no exception to sovereign immunity so as to allow
recovery for the destruction of an oil tanker).
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3. INSURERS. Insurance has been the traditional means of spreading cas-
ualty loss for everything from natural disasters to environmental damage and
toxic torts. While it is possible to develop insurance to cover cyberwar
losses, the insurance industry has yet to provide anything near comprehen-
sive coverage for cybercrime risks.73 The coverage that can be purchased
today is narrowly conscribed to losses that can be readily confirmed and
measured, and policy limits are generally modest.74 More importantly, insur-
ance policies of all types exclude coverage for losses resulting from acts of
war or civil unrest, because the potential amount of claims could be cata-
strophic.75 Although the insurance industry has developed some re-insurance
and refined pooling vehicles for hurricane and earthquake risk, those models
are unlikely to be employed for cyberwar risk because the statistical evidence
is simply not available to allow actuaries to calculate premiums. Therefore,
we conclude that insurance as an avenue for loss shifting is a dead end.
4. GOVERNMENT. The federal government has come to be viewed,
rightly or wrongly, as the insurer of last resort. What started with social
security and federal deposit insurance has expanded to a broad range of
transfer payments for natural disasters, healthcare, unemployment, and bad
business decisions even by the largest and wealthiest citizens. However,
each of these loss-shifting or pooling mechanisms has been authorized by
Congressional action, and it is unlikely that the political will exists to pass
legislation providing governmental loss-pooling for cyberwar losses, at least
until catastrophic losses have affected the economy. In the meantime, we
believe that the primary vehicle to shift cyberwar losses to the government
will be the theory that the military's use or destruction of civilian property
constituted a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment for which the owner is
entitled to compensation. We examine those issues in the remainder of this
article.
B. The Takings Clause Meets the War Power: A Sampler of the
Jurisprudence
The U.S. Constitution divides the federal government's war powers be-
tween the executive and legislative branches. Article 1, Section 8, gives
Congress the power to:
73. Technically, insurance can take two forms. The first is "loss shifting," where
an insured buys, by payment of a premium, the right to shift the loss to the
insurer. The second is "loss pooling," where pool members agree to create a
fund (pool) from which members' losses will be paid. ROBERT H. JERRY, NEW
APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 1.08 (2009). While the
distinctions would be important in designing an insurance program, they are
not material to the present discussion.
74. See Ann Kale, et al., CYBER LIABILITY AND INSURANCE: MANAGING THE RISKS
OF INTANGIBLE ASSETs (2010).
75. JERRY, supra note 73, § 1.6.
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provide for the common [d]efen[s]e and general [w]elfare of the
United States; [t]o declare [w]ar; [t]o raise and support [a]rmies;
[t]o provide and maintain a Navy; [t]o make [r]ules for the
[g]overnment and [r]egulation of the land and naval [florces; to
provide for calling forth the [m]ilitia to execute the [l]aws of the
Union, suppress [i]nsurrections and repel [i]nvasions.76
Article H, Section 2 gives the President unspecified powers as "Com-
mander in Chief."77 We accept as axiomatic that the Congressional power
includes providing for defense against cyber attacks and to launch cyber at-
tacks. We also assume that the Presidential power as Commander in Chief,
while not unlimited,78 provides the President with sufficient power to author-
ize military actions related to cyberwar.
On the other hand, the "Takings Clause" of the Fifth Amendment pro-
vides ". . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."79 The Clause was "designed to bar Government from forc-
ing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and jus-
tice, should be bome by the public as a whole."80
The question then arises: To what extent, if at all, does the Takings
Clause limit the power of the government under the War Powers to appropri-
ate, damage, or destroy private property in the course of defending or prose-
cuting a military action? Two ends of the spectrum can be easily identified.
At one end, the government does not ensure that citizens will escape property
damage from war: "[I]n wartime, many losses must be attributed solely to the
fortunes of war and not to the sovereign."81
At the other end, the government cannot appropriate property simply on
the grounds that it is necessary to prosecute potential wars. 82 Between these
extremes is an extensive gray area. Since the Civil War, the Supreme Court
76. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.
77. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. L
78. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(finding unconstitutional President's seizure of steel mills to ensure continued
production during wartime).
79. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
80. Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
81. U.S. v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1952) (holding that owners of re-
fineries were not entitled to compensation for army's destruction of refineries
so that they would not fall into enemy control).
82. See generally Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115 (1851) (finding that the owner
of mules and wagons who had been allowed to accompany military into Mex-
ico to trade with Mexicans was entitled to compensation for appropriation of
property for use in battle); see also United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. 623 (1871)
(finding that a steamboat owner was entitled to compensation for transporting
troops during the Civil War).
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has been unwilling to find a military taking or to state a bright-line test for
when a property owner is entitled to compensation for a loss arising from
military action.83 This is not surprising given the Court's admission that in
any context "[t]he question of what constitutes a 'taking' for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty."84
In our view, the unwillingness of the Court to establish a bright-line test
reflects an appreciation for the separation of powers, the judiciary's lack of
experience with potential scenarios, and the increasing complexity and im-
mediacy of warfare. In other words, the Court is wise in refraining from
treading where imposition of liability might have unforeseen consequences.85
Courts were not always reticent in requiring compensation for the mili-
tary's interference with property rights. Early war-takings cases included
holdings that required compensation on the ground that the military had not
shown a sufficiently imminent necessity. For example, Mitchell v. Harmony
held that an owner of mules and wagons who had been allowed to accom-
pany troops into Mexico and to trade with Mexicans was entitled to compen-
sation for appropriation of his property for use in battle and for pursuing
opposing troops farther into Mexico.86 And United States v. Russell awarded
a steamboat owner compensation for transporting troops during the Civil
War.87
However, the bench's generosity was short lived. The seminal modern
case is United States v. Pacific Railroad Co., which included a claim for
compensation for bridges the Union Army destroyed during the Civil War to
83. See, e.g. , Nat'l Bd. of YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969) (holding
that building owners were not entitled to compensation for destruction of their
building during riots in Panama because the damage occurred during conflict);
see also El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1139 (2005) (recognizing that the "role
of the judiciary branch . . . in the area of military takings . . . has been to draw a
'thin line between sovereign immunity and governmental liability," (quoting
Nat'l Bd. of YMCA v. United States, 396 F.2d 467, 472 (Ct. Cl. 1968))); see
also, Nat'l Bd. of YMCA, 396 F.2d at 471 (stating "in view of the broad lan-
guage of the fifth amendment and the difficulty we find in determining whether
compensation is required in this case, we look to the general principles an-
nounced in the decisional law to find the narrow and sometimes indistinct line
that separates losses that are necessary incidents of the ravages and burdens of
war from those situations where the Government is obliged to pay compensa-
tion to the owner of private property that is taken for public use.").
84. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
85. See Respublica v. Sparhawk, I U.S. 357, 363 (1788) (Chief Justice M'Kean
pointed to the "folly" of the mayor in London in 1666 who allowed half the
city to burn out of fear that he might be liable for trespass if he ordered the
destruction of property that would have stemmed the fire).
86. Mitchell, 54 U.S. at 135.
87. Russell, 80 U.S. at 629-30.
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impede the advance of the Confederate Army.88 The Court quoted a message
from President Grant to the Senate when he vetoed a bill that would have
provided compensation for property taken in war. 89 General Grant relied on
"a general principle of both international and municipal law" that all property
is held subject both to the right of the sovereign to take it for public use, upon
payment of just compensation, but also "subject to be temporarily occupied,
or even actually destroyed, in time of great public danger, and when the
public safety demands it; and in this latter case governments [d]o not admit a
legal obligation on their part to compensate the owner."9o
The principal that all property is, at least in some sense, held subject to
the common good became even more widely recognized after World War I-
the first war that implicated total mobilization of the American economy. An
oft-cited perspective is that of Charles Evans Hughes, a future Supreme
Court Justice, which he presented in a speech to the American Bar Associa-
tion after he lost the 1916 Presidential election to Woodrow Wilson. Hughes
recognized that war would require regulation of industries beyond what was
tolerable in peacetime. He stated:
The power to wage war is the power to wage war success-
fully. The framers of the Constitution were under no illusions as
to war . . . . In equipping the National Government with the
needed authority in war, they tolerated no limitations inconsistent
with that object, as they realized that the very existence of the
nation might be at stake and that every resource of the people
must be at command.
The extraordinary circumstances of war may bring particular
business(es) and enterprises clearly into the category of those
which are affected with a public interest and which demand imme-
diate and thorough-going public regulation. The production and
distribution of foodstuffs, articles of prime necessity, those which
have direct relation to military efficiency, those which are abso-
lutely required for the support of the people during the stress of
conflict, are plainly of this sort. Reasonable regulations to safe-
guard the resources upon which we depend for military success
must be regarded as being within the powers confided to Congress
to enable it to prosecute a successful war . ...
[I]t may be said that the power has been expressly given to
Congress to prosecute war, and to pass all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying that power into execution. That
power explicitly conferred and absolutely essential to the safety of
the Nation is not destroyed or impaired by any later provision of
the Constitution or by any one of the amendments. These may all
88. United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227 (1887).
89. Id. at 238
90. Id.
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be construed so as to avoid making the Constitution self-destruc-
tive, so as to preserve the rights of the citizen from unwarrantable
attack, while assuring beyond all hazard the common defense and
the perpetuity of our liberties. These rest upon the preservation of
the nation.
It has been said that the Constitution marches. That is, there
are constantly new applications of unchanged powers, and it is
ascertained that in novel and complex situations, the old grants
contain, in their general words and true significance, needed and
adequate authority. So, also, we have a fighting Constitution. We
cannot at this time fail to appreciate the wisdom of the fathers, as
under this charter, one hundred and thirty years old-the Constitu-
tion of Washington-the people of the United States fight with the
power of unity, as we fight for the freedom of our children and
that hereafter the sword of autocrats may never threaten the world.
The war powers of Congress and the President are only those
which are to be derived from the Constitution but . .. the primary
implication of a war power is that it shall be an effective power to
wage the war successfully. Thus, while the constitutional struc-
ture and controls of our government are our guides equally in war
and in peace, they must be read with the realistic purposes of the
entire instrument fully in mind.91
Since World War II, judicial respect for these necessities of war has
only increased. For example, Lichter v. United States reflects a strong judi-
cial deference to the needs of a nation at war.9 2 Justice Burton, writing for a
6-2 majority, started his opinion upholding the constitutionality of an excess
profits recoupment statute with the following statement:
The Renegotiation Act, in time of crisis, presented to this nation a new
legislative solution of a major phase of the problem of national defense
against world-wide aggression. Through its contribution to our production
program it sought to enable us to take the leading part in winning World War
II on an unprecedented scale of total global warfare without abandoning our
traditional faith in and reliance upon private enterprise and individual initia-
tive devoted to the public welfare.93
No doubt influenced by this view of the exigencies of war, the Court
held that the grant to the Government of the right to recoup "excessive prof-
its" did not constitute a taking of property without due process in violation of
91. Charles Evans Hughes, War Powers Under The Constitution, 42 A.B.A.REP.
232, 238-39, 247-48 (1917), reprinted in, 2 MARQ. L. REV. 3 (1918) (empha-
sis added).
92. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
93. Id. at 745-46 (footnote omitted).
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the Fifth Amendment.94 The Court's approach to the problems permitting
executive discretion to adapt to changing methods of war could have been
written with cyberwar in mind:
In total war it is necessary that a civilian make sacrifices of his property
and profits with at least the same fortitude as that with which a drafted sol-
dier makes his traditional sacrifices of comfort, security and life itself.95
The Court's equating the economic regulation of business to the con-
scription of soldiers was most significant. The Court recognized that both
the economic regulation of the Renegotiation Act and the draft sprang from
the war power, and "[e]ach was a part of a national policy adopted in time of
crisis in the conduct of total global warfare by a nation dedicated to the pres-
ervation, practice and development of the maximum measure of individual
freedom consistent with the unity of effort essential to success." 96 Moreover,
the Court argued that "mobilized property in the form of equipment and sup-
plies became as essential as mobilized manpower," and that mobilization ex-
tended beyond the uniformed armed services to the entire population.97
Indeed, the court used the acceptance of the constitutionality of the draft
to justify the alleged economic taking:
The conscription of manpower is a more vital interference
with the life, liberty and property of the individual than is the con-
scription of his property or his profits or any substitute for such
conscription of them. For his hazardous, full-time service in the
armed forces, a soldier is paid whatever the Government deems to
be a fair but modest compensation. Comparatively speaking, the
manufacturer of war goods undergoes no such hazard to his per-
sonal safety as does a front-line soldier and yet the Renegotiation
Act gives him far better assurance of a reasonable return for his
wartime services than the Selective Service Act and all its related
legislation give to the men in the armed forces.98
Having established the government's right to take profits, the Court held
that the public interest was satisfied by the imposition of adequate procedural
safeguards to conform "to the constitutional limitations under which Con-
gress was permitted to exercise its basic powers."99 In deciding what process
94. Id. at 801-02.
95. Id. at 754.
96. Id. at 755.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 756.
99. Id. at 765. It should be noted that the payment of normal profits does not mean
that there was no taking of excess profits. From the economic viewpoint, the
case could be viewed as the equivalent of a finding that the government had
taken the goods produced in exchange for "just compensation" in the form of a
fair profit.
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was due, Justice Burton stated that Congress had two choices: It could have
conscripted property and manpower along a totalitarian model or it could
have and did opt for a plan of renegotiation that allowed the government to
contract now and set the final price later.oo A choice the Court stated "ap-
pears in its true light as the very symbol of a free people united in reaching
unequalled productive capacity and yet retaining the maximum of individual
freedom consistent with a general mobilization of effort."10 The Court
therefore held that the procedures incorporated in the Renegotiation Act pro-
vided due process and upheld the constitutionality of the Act.102
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co. is another case in which the
Court held that the war power trumped the takings clause.10 3 The case in-
volved a takings challenge to an order of the War Production Board (WPB)
that essentially made gold mines dormant.104 The order classified the indus-
try as "nonessential" to the nation's ability to wage World War II and di-
rected each mine operator to close down its operations except for minimum
activity necessary to maintain the mine.1O5 The Supreme Court held that the
order did not constitute a taking of the mining companies' property, entitling
them to compensation under the Fifth Amendment:
[T]he WPB made a reasoned decision that, under existing cir-
cumstances, the Nation's need was such that the unrestricted use
of mining equipment and manpower in gold mines was so waste-
ful of wartime resources that it must be temporarily suspended.
Traditionally, we have treated the issue as to whether a particular
governmental restriction amounted to a constitutional taking as
being a question properly turning upon the particular circum-
stances of each case. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U. S. 393, 416. In doing so, we have recognized that action in the
form of regulation can so diminish the value of property as to
constitute a taking. . . . In the context of war, we have been reluc-
tant to find that degree of regulation which, without saying so,
requires compensation to be paid for resulting losses of in-
come. . . . The reasons are plain. War, particularly in modem
times, demands the strict regulation of nearly all resources. It
makes demands which otherwise would be insufferable. But war-
time economic restrictions, temporary in character, are insignifi-
100. See id.
101. Id. at 766.
102. Id. at 787. Lichter could also be viewed as a due process case. That is, the
Court might have found a taking if Congress had not provided sufficient proce-
dural safeguards to ensure that the appropriate profit was fairly determined.
103. See United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
104. Id. at 156.
105. Id.
[Vol. XIII278
Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Casualties
cant when compared to the widespread uncompensated loss of life
and freedom of action which war traditionally demands.
We do not find in the temporary restrictions here placed on
the operation of gold mines a taking of private property that would
justify a departure from the trend of the above decisions. The
WPB here sought, by reasonable regulation, to conserve the lim-
ited supply of equipment used by the mines and it hoped that its
order would divert available miners to more essential work. Both
purposes were proper objectives; both matters were subject to reg-
ulation to the extent of the order. L-208 did not order any disposal
of property or transfer of men. Accordingly, since the damage to
the mine owners was incidental to the Government's lawful regu-
lation of matters reasonably deemed essential to the war effort, the
judgment is reversed. 106
The most recent opinion addressing takings and military action issued in
the context of the U.S. military response to riots in the Panama Canal
Zone. 07 In National Board of YMCA v. United States, the Court held that
building owners were not entitled to compensation when soldiers occupied
their buildings while responding to a riot and attempting to protect their
property.108 The Court decided the case on fairly narrow grounds that the
soldiers were acting for the benefit of the owners:
Of course, any protection of private property also serves a broader pub-
lic purpose. But where, as here, the private party is the particular intended
beneficiary of the governmental activity, 'fairness and justice' do not require
that losses which may result from that activity 'be borne by the public as a
whole,' even though the activity may also be intended incidentally to benefit
the public.109
106. Id. at 168-69. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan did not view the regulation in
the same perspective. Frankfurter thought that the lower court improperly
jumped to the constitutional question before construing the statue pursuant to
which the cases were brought to determine whether Congress actually intended
to award compensation. Id. at 179 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Harlan, how-
ever, took the bull by the horns and castigated the majority for moving beyond
precedent without adequate justification. He argued that previous cases deny-
ing compensation for losses resulting from wartime regulatory measures were
readily distinguishable because the country was under "conditions of total mo-
bilization" and the matters regulated had ramifications "touching everyone in
one degree or another." Id. at 183-184 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The WPB,
however, under the guise of regulation, accomplished the equivalent of outright
physical seizure of private property. Id. Thus, Harlan argued, the Court should
treat the WPB's order as what it was "in every realistic sense . . . a temporary
confiscation of respondents' property." Id.
107. Nat'l Board. of YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969).
108. Id. at 92.
109. Id.
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The Court also found an independent basis for denying the takings
claim; the physical occupation by the troops did not deprive the petitioners of
any use of their buildings:
[W]e conclude that the temporary, unplanned occupation of
petitioners' buildings in the course of battle does not constitute
direct and substantial enough government involvement to warrant
compensation under the Fifth Amendment. We have no occasion
to decide whether compensation might be required where the
Government in some fashion not present here makes private prop-
erty a particular target for destruction by private parties.1o
In summary, the Supreme Court has demonstrated substantial reluctance
to second-guess military requisitions and actions in wartime. We now turn to
the particular case of potential takings justified by the prosecution of
cyberwar.
C. Does Conscription of Assets Constitute a Taking?
In Conscripts, we described a possible means by which the Federal
Government could combat cyberwar by drafting individuals into a Cyberwar
National Guard (CNG). II The CNG would create a ready workforce of
cyber warriors.112 However, as mentioned above, the CNG would not be
effective unless its warriors were armed with appropriate intellectual prop-
erty and information technology.113
Let us assume that the Federal Government passes a law that prohibits
employers from terminating the employment of members of the CNG and
requires the employer to provide its CNG member-employees with access to
and the right to use the IT and equipment normally used in their occupation.
Let us further assume that Congress does not include any appropriation for
paying the employer for that access and use by the CNG. Is the employer
entitled to compensation for the "taking" of its property to support the CNG?
The short answer, based on existing precedent, is "probably not." First,
as noted above, the Supreme Court has noted the close analogy between con-
scription and regulation of property in connection with military activity.114 If
the government can draft the full-time services of individuals and thereby
deprive an employer of the conscripts' services, it follows that the govern-
ment can draft them for their part-time services, even if doing so deprives the
employer of part of the services it has purchased.
110. Id. at 93-94.
111. Brenner & Clarke, supra note 7, (manuscript at 56).
112. See id.
113. See § I(A)(2) supra.
114. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 765-66 (1948).
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Moreover, the mandatory employment concept seems to be the func-
tional equivalent of a taking of the employees' wages-assuming the em-
ployer is required to continue paying the employees. Thus, the issue distills
to whether the government can require the civilian firm to provide to the
conscript the tangible and intangible assets the conscript would otherwise use
in the course of her employment. We now turn to that issue.
D. Compensation for Access and Use of Civilian Property in
Cyberwar
The authorities discussed above have addressed traditional, kinetic war,
but their logic applies equally to cyberwar.115 As in Eureka, a military order
(pursuant to a congressionally authorized administrative procedure) requiring
a civilian property owner to provide the government with access to and the
right to use assets would not permanently deprive the civilian of those assets.
More fundamentally, the Court-even at the distance of thirteen years
from WWH-did not see the shutdown of the mine as imposing a burden
different than that legitimately imposed on any citizen in wartime. Thus, to
the extent that a court is persuaded that a cyber attack is indeed the
equivalent of war,116 the owner will not be entitled to compensation for the
government's use of that property in fighting the war (whether in a defensive
or offensive mode) or for the government's restriction on the owner's use of
the property or even its destruction.
Of course, there is always the possibility that the government's interfer-
ence with private property will become too attenuated from the conflict.
Mitchell and Russell are often distinguished, but they are still good law. Ac-
cordingly, they could still require compensation for a government action that
is too remote in time or in necessity. Recent jurisprudence, such as El-Shifa,
however, demonstrates a strong judicial deference to the other branches of
government to make those nexus decisions.117
Moreover, it is also likely that the government will be able to offer a
credible argument that the increasing co-dependence of markets and competi-
tors supports a finding that the civilian grow inured to military action. In
115. Questions of Presidential power to take military action without Congressional
authority are complex and beyond the scope of this article. For an analysis of
those issues, see Sidney Buchanan, A Proposed Model for Determining the
Validity of the Use of Force Against Foreign Adversaries Under the United
States Constitution, 29 Hous. L. REv. 379 (1992) (discussing the constitutional
scope of both Congress and the President during wartime); see also Jules
Lobel, Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent
Power Over the Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 391 (2008) (discussing the
power between the President and Congress to take action and conduct war).
116. See Brenner & Clarke, supra note 7.
117. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. v. United States, 402 F. Supp. 2d 267 (D.D.C.
2005). (Sudanese company alleging destruction of its plant by U.S. military
failed to allege a valid takings claim).
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other words, the military's taking actually protected the claimant from even
greater harm. If this paternalistic argument was persuasive with the 1666
London fire, the 1964 Panamanian riots, and the 1980 blocking of Iranian
assets," 8 it should be equally persuasive as applied to cyberwar attacks,
which can happen instantaneously, without warning and without relation to
military assets.
Courts should be reluctant to find that regulation or required access to
civilian property was either premature or unnecessary in fighting a cyberwar.
Defense of cyberwar requires thorough investigation, planning, and prepara-
tion. That defense is complicated by the complexities of global information
networks, the instantaneous nature of attacks, their ambiguity as to source,
duration and intent, and the potential consequential damages. Therefore,
even conscription or asset requisitions to deal with the threat of cyberwar
should not be deemed too remote in time.
This is especially so because it is unlikely that a civilian can show a
total deprivation of use before an attack since most IT assets can be used on a
non-exclusive basis. Thus, civilians will have a difficult time demonstrating
anything more than a temporary loss of income from government regulation.
And this is a property interest that the Supreme Court has never accorded
much weight, even in non-military situations.19
In summary, forced prevention, readiness, and response efforts directed
by the military should not be considered takings, at least in the absence of the
destruction of assets, permanent foreclosure against use, or arbitrary requisi-
tion procedures without possibility of judicial review.
V. CONCLUSION
Cyberwar is a reality that civilians must address regardless of their con-
fidence in their existing IT security. If government and industry are slow in
addressing cyberwarfare risk, it is not because the incentives are not present
or the tools unavailable. Executives of civilian private sector enterprises
have fiduciary duties to protect enterprise assets and reduce liabilities by em-
ploying traditional risk management principles. Managers of governmental
civilian enterprises have similar public duties. The urgency of sound risk
management is heightened by the lack of loss-shifting alternatives. Although
civilians can protect themselves by contract from liabilities to customers aris-
ing from cyberwar disruptions and losses, they will not be able, except in
rare, fortuitous circumstances, to pass losses up their supply chains, to insur-
ers or to that last recourse, the federal government.
118. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (blocking and attachments
of assets during the Iranian hostage crises were not an unconstitutional
takings).
119. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding
that the denial of approval of construction plans did not constitute a taking
because the restrictions were related to the public welfare and permitted rea-
sonable beneficial use).
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